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Abstract
We study the basic operation of set union in the global model of differential privacy. In this problem,
we are given a universe U of items, possibly of infinite size, and a database D of users. Each user i
contributes a subset Wi ⊆ U of items. We want an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm which outputs a
subset S ⊂ ∪iWi such that the size of S is as large as possible. The problem arises in countless real world
applications; it is particularly ubiquitous in natural language processing (NLP) applications as vocabulary
extraction. For example, discovering words, sentences, n-grams etc., from private text data belonging to
users is an instance of the set union problem.
Known algorithms for this problem proceed by collecting a subset of items from each user, taking
the union of such subsets, and disclosing the items whose noisy counts fall above a certain threshold.
Crucially, in the above process, the contribution of each individual user is always independent of the
items held by other users, resulting in a wasteful aggregation process, where some item counts happen to
be way above the threshold. We deviate from the above paradigm by allowing users to contribute their
items in a dependent fashion, guided by a policy. In this new setting ensuring privacy is significantly
delicate. We prove that any policy which has certain contractive properties would result in a differentially
private algorithm. We design two new algorithms, one using Laplace noise and other Gaussian noise, as
specific instances of policies satisfying the contractive properties. Our experiments show that the new
algorithms significantly outperform previously known mechanisms for the problem.
1 Introduction
Natural language models for applications such as suggested replies for e-mails and dialog systems rely on
the discovery of n-grams and sentences [HLLC14, KKR+16, CLB+19, DBS19]. Words and phrases used for
training come from individuals, who may be left vulnerable if personal information is revealed. For example,
a model could generate a sentence or predict a word that can potentially reveal personal information of the
users in the training set [CLE+19]. Therefore, algorithms that allow the public release of the words, n-grams,
and sentences obtained from users’ text while preserving privacy are desirable. Additional applications of this
problem include the release of search queries and keys in SQL queries [KKMN09, WZL+20]. While other
privacy definitions are common in practice, guaranteeing differential privacy, introduced in the seminal work
of Dwork et al [DMNS06], ensures users the strongest preservation of privacy. In this paper we consider user
level privacy.
Definition 1.1 (Differential Privacy [DR14a]). A randomized algorithm A is (ε,δ)-differentially private if
for any two neighboring databases D and D′, which differ in exactly the data pertaining to a single user, and
for all sets S of possible outputs:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
∗Author ordering is alphabetical.
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An algorithm satisfying differential privacy (DP) guarantees that its output does not change by much
if a single user is either added or removed from the dataset. Moreover, the guarantee holds regardless of
how the output of the algorithm is used downstream. Therefore, items (e.g. n-grams) produced using a
DP algorithm can be used in other applications without any privacy concerns. Since its introduction a
decade ago [DMNS06], differential privacy has become the de facto notion of privacy in statistical analysis
and machine learning, with a vast body of research work (see Dwork and Roth [DR+14b] and Vadhan
[Vad17] for surveys) and growing acceptance in industry. Differential privacy is deployed in many industries,
including Apple [App17], Google [EPK14, BEM+17], Microsoft [DKY17], Mozilla [AKZ+17], and the US
Census Bureau [Abo16, KCK+18].
The vocabulary extraction and n-gram discovery problems mentioned above, as well as many commonly
studied problems [KKMN09, WZL+20], can be abstracted as a set union which leads to the following problem.
Problem 1.1 (Differentially Private Set Union (DPSU)). Let U be some universe of items, possibly of
unbounded size. Suppose we are given a database D of users where each user i has a subset Wi ⊆ U . We
want an (ε,δ)-differentially private Algorithm A which outputs a subset S ⊆ ∪iWi such that the size of S is
as large as possible.
Since the universe of items can be unbounded, as in our motivating examples, it is not clear how to
apply the exponential mechanism [MT07] to DPSU. Furthermore, even for the cases when U is bounded,
implementing the exponential mechanism can be also very inefficient. Existing algorithms 1 for this problem
[KKMN09, WZL+20] collect a bounded number of items from each user, build a histogram of these items,
and disclose the items whose noisy counts fall above a certain threshold. In these algorithms, the contribution
of each user is always independent from the identity of items held by other users, resulting in a wasteful
aggregation process, where some items’ counts could be far above the threshold. Since the goal is to release
as large a set as possible rather than to release accurate counts of each item, there could be more efficient
ways to allocate the weight to users’ items.
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Figure 1: Size of the set output by our proposed algorithms Policy Laplace and Policy Gaussian
compared to natural generalizations of previously known algorithms for various values of privacy parameter ε
and δ = exp(−10).
We deviate from the previous methods by allowing users to contribute their items in a dependent fashion,
guided by an update policy. In our algorithms, proving privacy is more delicate as some update policies can
result in histograms with unbounded sensitivity. We prove a meta-theorem to show that update policies with
certain contractive properties would result in differentially private algorithms. The main contributions of the
paper are:
1They don’t study the DPSU problem as defined in this paper. Their goal is to output approximate counts of as many items
as possible in ∪iWi.
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• Guided by our meta-theorems, we introduce two new algorithms called Policy Laplace and Policy
Gaussian for the DPSU problem. Both of them run in linear time and only require a single pass over
the users’ data.
• Using a Reddit dataset, we demonstrate that our algorithms significantly improve the size of DP set
union even when compared to natural generalizations of the existing mechanisms for this problem (see
Figure 1).
Our algorithms are being productized in industry to make a basic subroutine in an NLP application
differentially private.
1.1 Baseline algorithms
To understand the DPSU problem better, let us start with the simplest case we can solve by known
techniques. Define ∆0 = maxi |Wi|. Suppose ∆0 = 1. This special case can be solved using the algorithms in
[KKMN09, WZL+20]. Their algorithm works as follows: Construct a histogram on ∪iWi (the set of items in
a database D) where the count of each item is the number of sets it belongs to. Then add Laplace noise or
Gaussian noise to the counts of each item. Finally, release only those items whose noisy histogram counts
are above a certain threshold ρ. It is not hard to prove that if the threshold is set sufficiently high, then the
algorithm is (ε, δ)-DP.
A straight-forward extension of the histogram algorithm for ∆0 > 1 is to upper bound the `1-sensitivity by
∆0 (and `2-sensitivity by
√
∆0), and then add some appropriate amount of Laplace noise (or Gaussian noise)
based on sensitivity. The threshold ρ has to be set based on ∆0. The Laplace noise based algorithm was
also the approach considered in [KKMN09, WZL+20]. This approach has the following drawback. Suppose a
significant fraction of users have sets of size smaller than ∆0. Then constructing a histogram based on counts
of the items results in wastage of sensitivity budget. A user i with |Wi| < ∆0 can increment the count of
items in Wi by any vector v ∈ RWi as long as one can ensure that `1 sensitivity is bounded by ∆0 (or `2
sensitivity is bounded by
√
∆0 if adding Gaussian noise). Consider the following natural generalization of
Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms to create a weighted histogram of elements. A weighted histogram over a
domain X is any map H : X → R. For an item u ∈ U, H(u) is called the weight of u. In the rest of the paper,
the term histogram should be interpreted as weighted histogram. Each user i updates the weight of each item
u ∈ Wi using the rule:H[u] := H[u] + (∆0/|Wi|)1/p for p = 1, 2. It is not hard to see that `p-sensitivity of
this weighted histogram is still ∆
1/p
0 . Adding Laplace noise (for p = 1) or Gaussian noise (for p = 2) to each
item of the weighted histogram, and releasing only those items above an appropriately calibrated threshold
will lead to differentially private output. We call these algorithms as Weighted Laplace and Weighted
Gaussian, they will be used as benchmarks to compare against our new algorithms.
1.2 Our techniques
The Weighted Laplace and Weighted Gaussian mechanisms described above can be thought of trying
to solve the following variant of a Knapsack problem. Here each item u ∈ U is a bin and we gain a profit of 1
if the total weight of the item in the weighted histogram constructed is more than the threshold. Each user
can increment the weight of elements u ∈Wi using an update policy φ which is defined as follows.
Definition 1.2 (Update policy). An update policy is a map φ : RU×2U → RU such that supp(φ(H,W )−H) ⊂
W , i.e., φ can only update the weights of items in W . And the ith user updates H to φ(H,Wi). Since Wi is
typically understood from context, we will write φ(H) instead of φ(H,Wi) for simplicity.
In this framework, the main technical challenge is the following:
How to design update policies such that the sensitivity of the resulting weighted histogram is small while
maximizing the number of bins that are full?
Note that bounding sensitivity requires that ‖φ(H,W )−H‖`p ≤ C for some constant C i.e. each user
has an `p-budget of C and can increase the weights of items in their set by an `p-distance of at most C. By
scaling, WLOG we can assume that C = 1. Note that having a larger value of ∆0 should help in filling more
bins as users have more choice in how they can use their budget to increment the weight of items.
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In this paper, we consider algorithms which iteratively construct the weighted histogram. That is, in our
algorithms, we consider users in a random order, and each user updates the weighted histogram using the
update policy φ. Algorithm 1 is a meta-algorithm for DP set union, and all our subsequent algorithms follow
this framework.
Algorithm 1 High level meta algorithm for DP Set Union
Input: D: Database of n users where each user i has some subset Wi ⊂ U
ρ: threshold
Noise: Noise distribution (Lap(0, λ) or N (0, σ2))
Output: S: A subset of ∪iWi
Build weighted histogram H supported over ∪iWi using Algorithm 2.
S = {} (empty set)
for u ∈ ∪iWi do
Hˆ[u]← H[u] + Noise
if Hˆ[u] > ρ then
S ← S ∪ {u}
end if
end for
Output S
Algorithm 2 High level meta algorithm for building weighted histogram using a given update policy
Input: D: Database of n users where each user i has some subset Wi ⊂ U
∆0: maximum contribution parameter
hash: A random hash function which maps user ids into some large domain without collisions
φ: Update policy for a user to update the weights of items in their set
Output: H: A weighted histogram in R∪iWi
H = {} (empty histogram)
Sort users into User1,User2, . . . ,Usern by sorting the hash values of their user ids under the hash function
hash
for i = 1 to n do
Wi ← set with Useri
if |Wi| > ∆0 then
W ′i ← Randomly choose ∆0 items from Wi
else
W ′i ←Wi
end if
Update H[u] for each u ∈W ′i using update policy φ
end for
Output H
If the update policy is such that it increments the weights of items independent of other users (as done in
Weighted Laplace and Weighted Gaussian), then it is not hard to see that sensitivity of H can be
bounded by 1; that is, by the budget of each user. However, if some item is already way above the threshold
ρ, then it does not make much sense to waste the limited budget on that item. Ideally, users can choose a
clever update policy to distribute their budget among the Wi items based on the current weights.
Note that if a policy is such that updates of a user depends on other users, it can be quite tricky to bound
the sensitivity of the resulting weighted histogram. To illustrate this, consider for example the greedy update
policy. Each user i can use his budget of 1 to fill the bins that is closest to the threshold among the bins
u ∈Wi. If an item already reached the threshold, the user can spend his remaining budget incrementing the
weight of next bin that is closest to the threshold and so on. Note that from our Knapsack problem analogy
this seems be a good way to maximize the number of bins filled. However such a greedy policy can have very
large sensitivity (see appendix for an example), and hence won’t lead to any reasonable DP algorithm. So,
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the main contribution of the paper is in showing policies which help maximize the number of item bins that
are filled while keeping the sensitivity low. In particular, we define a general class of `p-contractive update
policies and show that they produce weighted histograms with bounded `p-sensitivity.
Definition 1.3 (`p-contractive update policy). We say that an update policy φ is `p-contractive if there
exists a subset I (called the invariant subset for φ) of pairs of weighted histograms which are at an `p distance
of at most 1, i.e.,
I ⊂
{
(H1, H2) : ‖H1 −H2‖`p ≤ 1
}
such that the following conditions hold.
1. (Invariance) (H1, H2) ∈ I ⇒ (φ(H1), φ(H2)) ∈ I.2
2. (φ(H), H) ∈ I for all H.
Property (2) of Definition 1.3 requires that the update policy can change the histogram by an `p distance
of at most 1 (budget of a user).
Theorem 1.1 (Contractivity implies bounded sensitivity). Suppose φ is an update policy which is `p-
contractive over some invariant subset I. Then the histogram output by Algorithm 2 has `p-sensitivity
bounded by 1.
We prove Theorem 1.1 in Section 3. Once we have bounded `p-sensitivity, we can get a DP Set Union
algorithm with some additional technical work.
Theorem 1.2. (Informal: Bounded sensitivity implies DP) For p ∈ {1, 2}, if the `p-sensitivity of the
weighted histogram output by Algorithm 2 is bounded, then Algorithm 1 for DP Set Union can be made
(ε, δ)-differentially private by appropriately choosing the noise distribution (Noise) and threshold (ρ).
The main contribution of the paper is two new algorithms guided by Theorem 1.1. The first algorithm,
which we call Policy Laplace, uses update policy that is `1-contractive. The second algorithm, which
we call Policy Gaussian, uses update policy that is `2-contractive. Finally we show that our algorithms
significantly outperform the weighted update policies.
At a very high-level, the role of contractivity in our algorithms is indeed similar to its role in the recent
elegant work of Feldman et al [FMTT18]. They show that if an iterative algorithm is contractive in each
step, then adding Gaussian noise in each iteration will lead to strong privacy amplification. In particular,
users who make updates early on will enjoy much better privacy guarantees. However their framework is not
applicable in our setting, because their algorithm requires adding noise to the count of every item in every
iteration; this will lead to unbounded growth of counts and items which belong to only a single user can also
get output which violates privacy.
2 Preliminaries
Let D denote the collection of all databases. We say that D,D′ are neighboring databases, denoted by
D ∼ D′, if they differ in exactly one user.
Definition 2.1. For p ≥ 0, the `p-sensitivity of f : D → Rk is defined as supD∼D′ ‖f(D)− f(D′)‖`p where
the supremum is over all neighboring databases D,D′.
Proposition 2.1 (The Laplace Mechanism [DR14a]). Given any function f : D → Rk, the Laplace
Mechanism is defined as:
M(x, f(.), ε) = f(x) + (Yi, ..., Yk) (1)
where ∆1 is the `1-sensitivity and Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap(0,∆1/ε) .
2Note that property (1) is a slightly weaker requirement than the usual notion of `p-contractivity which requires
‖φ(H1)− φ(H2)‖`p ≤ ‖H1 −H2‖`p for all H1, H2. Instead we require contraction only for (H1, H2) ∈ I.
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Proposition 2.2 (Gaussian Mechanism [BW18]). If f : D → Rd is a function with `2-sensitivity ∆2. For
any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the Gaussian output perturbation mechanism M(x) = f(x) + Z with Z ∼ N (0, σ2I)
is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if
Φ
(
∆2
2σ
− εσ
∆2
)
− eεΦ
(
−∆2
2σ
− εσ
∆2
)
≤ δ.
Definition 2.2. We say that two distributions P,Q on a domain X are (ε, δ)-close to each other, denoted
by P ≈ε,δ Q, if for every S ⊂ X, we have
1. Prx∼P [x ∈ S] ≤ eε Prx∼Q[x ∈ S] + δ and
2. Prx∼Q[x ∈ S] ≤ eε Prx∼P [x ∈ S] + δ.
We say that two random variables X,Y are (ε, δ)-close to each other, denoted by X ≈ε,δ Y , if their
distributions are (ε, δ)-close to each other.
We will need the following lemmas which are useful to prove (ε, δ)-DP.
Lemma 2.1. Let P,Q be probability distributions over a domain X. If there exists an event E s.t.
P (E) = 1− δ′ and P |E ≈ε,δ Q, then P ≈ε,δ+δ′ Q.
Proof. Fix some subset S ⊆ X.
Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S] = P (E¯) Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S|E¯] + P [E] Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S|E]
≤ P (E¯) + Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S|E]
= δ′ + Pr
x∼P |E
[x ∈ S]
≤ δ′ + eε Pr
x∼Q
[x ∈ S] + δ
We now prove the other direction.
Pr
x∼Q
[x ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr
x∼P |E
[x ∈ S] + δ
≤ eεPrx∼P [x ∈ S]
P (E)
+ δ
= eε
Prx∼P [x ∈ S]
1− δ′ + δ
= eε Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S] + δ′
(
eε Prx∼P [x ∈ S]
1− δ′
)
+ δ
Now if eε Prx∼P [x ∈ S] ≤ 1− δ′, then we have Prx∼Q[x ∈ S] ≤ eε Prx∼P [x ∈ S] + δ′ + δ. Otherwise, trivially
Pr
x∼Q
[x ∈ S] ≤ 1 ≤ eε Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S] + δ′ + δ.
We will also need the fact that if X ≈ε,δ Y , then after post-processing they also remain (ε, δ)-close.
Lemma 2.2. If two random variables X,Y are (ε, δ)-close and M is any randomized algorithm, then
M(X) ≈ε,δ M(Y ).
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Proof. Let M(z) = F (z,R) for some function F where R is the random bits used by M . For any subset S of
the possible outputs of M ,
Pr[M(X) ∈ S] = Pr
X,R
[F (X,R) ∈ S]
=
∑
r
Pr[R = r] Pr
X
[F (X, r) ∈ S]
≤
∑
r
Pr[R = r]
(
eε Pr
Y
[F (Y, r) ∈ S] + δ
)
= eε
∑
r
Pr[R = r] Pr
Y
[F (Y, r) ∈ S] + δ
= eε Pr
X,R
[F (Y,R) ∈ S] + δ.
The other direction holds by symmetry.
3 Contractivity implies DP algorithms
In this section, we show that if an update policy satisfies contractive property as in Definition 1.3, we can
use it to develop a DPSU algorithm. First we show that contractivity of update policy implies bounded
sensitivity (Theorem 1.1), which in turn implies a DPSU algorithm by Theorem 1.2. We will first define
sensitivity and update policy formally. Let D denote the collection of all databases. We say that D,D′ are
neighboring databases, denoted by D ∼ D′, if they differ in exactly one user.
Definition 3.1. For p ≥ 0, the `p-sensitivity of f : D → Rk is defined as supD∼D′ ‖f(D)− f(D′)‖`p where
the supremum is over all neighboring databases D,D′.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let φ be an `p-contractive update policy with invariant subset I. Consider two
neighboring databases D1 and D2 where D1 has one extra user compared to D2. Let H1 and H2 denote the
histograms built by Algorithm 1 using the update policy φ when the databases are D1 and D2 respectively.
Say the extra user in D1 has position t in the global ordering given by the hash function. Let H
t−1
1 and
Ht−12 be the histograms after the first t− 1 (according to the global order given by the hash function hash)
users’ data is added to the histogram. Therefore Ht−11 = H
t−1
2 . And the new user updates H
t−1
1 to H
t
1. By
property (2) in Definition 1.3 of `p-contractive policy, (φ(H
t−1
1 )), H
t−1
1 ) ∈ I. Since φ(Ht−11 ) = Ht1, we have
(Ht1, H
t−1
1 ) = (H
t
1, H
t−1
2 ) ∈ I. The remaining users are now added to Ht1, Ht−12 in the same order. Note
that we are using the fact that the users are sorted according some hash function and they contribute in
that order (this is also needed to claim that Ht−11 = H
t−1
2 ). Therefore, by property (1) in Definition 1.3 of
`p-contractive policy, we get (H1, H2) ∈ I. Since I only contains pairs with `p-distance at most 1, we have
‖H1 −H2‖`p ≤ 1. Therefore the histogram built by Algorithm 2 using φ has `p-sensitivity of at most 1.
Above theorem implies that once we have a `p contractive update policy, we can appeal to Theorem 1.2
to design an algorithm for DPSU.
4 Policy Laplace algorithm
In this section we will present an `1-contractive update policy called `1-descent (Algorithm 3) and use it to
obtain a DP Set Union algorithm called Policy Laplace (Algorithm 4).
4.1 `1-descent update policy
The policy is described in Algorithm 3. We will set some cutoff Γ above the threshold ρ to use in the update
policy. Once the weight of an item (H[u]) crosses the cutoff, we do not want to increase it further. In this
policy, each user starts with a budget of 1. The user uniformly increases H[u] for each u ∈W ′i s.t. H[u] < Γ.
Once some item’s weight reaches Γ, the user stops increasing that item and keeps increasing the rest of the
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items until the budget of 1 is expended. To implement this efficiently, the ∆0 items from each user are sorted
based on distance to the cutoff. Beginning with the item whose weight is closest to the cutoff Γ (but still
below the cutoff), say item u, we will add Γ−H[u] (gap to cutoff for item u) to each of the items below the
cutoff. This repeats until the user’s budget of 1 has been expended.
This policy can also be interpreted as gradient descent to minimize the `1-distance between the current
weighted histogram and the point (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ), hence the name `1-descent. Since the gradient vector is 1
in coordinates where the weight is below cutoff Γ and 0 in coordinates where the weight is Γ, the `1-descent
policy is moving in the direction of the gradient until it has moved a total `1-distance of at most 1.
Algorithm 3 `1-descent update policy
Input: H: Current histogram
W : A subset of U of size at most ∆0
Γ: cutoff parameter
Output: H: Updated histogram
// Build cost dictionary G
G = {} // Empty dictionary
for u ∈W do
if H[u] < Γ then
// Gap to cutoff for items below cutoff Γ
G[u]← Γ−H[u]
end if
end for
budget ← 1 // Each user gets a total budget of 1
K ← |G| // Number of items still under cutoff
// Sort in increasing order of the gap Γ−H[u]
G← sort(G)
// Let u1, u2, . . . , u|B| be the sorted order
for j = 1 to |B| do
// Cost of increasing weights of remaining K items by G[uj ]
cost = G[uj ] ·K
if cost ≤ budget then
for ` = j to |G| do
H[u`]← H[u`] +G[uj ]
// Gap to cutoff is reduced by G[uj ]
G[u`]← G[u`]−G[uj ]
end for
budget ← budget - cost
// uj has reached cutoff, so decrease K by 1
K ← K − 1
else
for ` = j to |G| do
// Update item weights by as much as remaining budget allows
H[u`]← H[u`] + budgetK
break
end for
end if
end for
4.2 Policy Laplace
The Policy Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 4) for DPSU uses the framework of the meta algorithm in
Algorithm 1 with the update policy in Algorithm 3. Since the added noise is Lap(0, λ), which is centered at
0, we want to set the cutoff Γ in the update policy to be sufficiently above the threshold ρ. Thus we pick
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Γ = ρLap + α · λ for some α > 0. From our experiments, choosing α ∈ [2, 6] works best empirically. The
parameters λ, ρLap are set so as to achieve (ε, δ)-DP as shown in Theorem 4.1.
Algorithm 4 Policy Laplace algorithm for DPSU
Input: D: Database of n users where each user has some subset W ⊂ U
∆0: maximum contribution parameter
(ε, δ): privacy parameters
α: parameter for setting cutoff
Output: S: A subset of ∪iWi
λ← 1/ε // Noise parameter in Lap(0, λ)
// Threshold parameter
ρLap ← max1≤t≤∆0 1t + 1ε log
(
1
2(1−(1−δ)1/t)
)
Γ← ρLap + α · λ // Cutoff parameter for update policy
Run Algorithm 1 with Noise ∼ Lap(0, λ) and the `1-descent update policy in Algorithm 3 to output S.
4.3 Privacy analysis of Policy Laplace
In this section, we will prove that the Policy Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 4) is (ε, δ)-DP. By Theorem 1.2
and Theorem 1.1, it is enough to show that `1-descent policy (Algorithm 3) is `1-contractive. For two
histograms G1, G2, we write G1 ≥ G2 if G1[u] ≥ G2[u] for each every item u. G1 ≤ G2 is defined similarly.
Lemma 4.1. Let I = {(G1, G2) : G1 ≥ G2, ‖G1 −G2‖`1 ≤ 1}. Then `1-descent update policy is
`1-contractive over the invariant subset I.
Proof. Let φ denote the `1-descent update policy.
We will first show property (2) of Definition 1.3. Let G be any weighted histogram and let G′ = φ(G).
Clearly G′ ≥ G as the new user will never decrease the weight of any item. Moreover, the total change to the
histogram is at most 1 in `1-distance. Therefore ‖G′ −G‖`1 ≤ 1. Therefore (G′, G) ∈ I.
We will now prove property (1) of Definition 1.3. Let (G1, G2) ∈ I, i.e., G1 ≥ G2 and ‖G1 −G2‖`1 ≤ 1.
Let G′1 = φ(G1), G
′
2 = φ(G2). A new user can increase G1 and G2 by at most 1 in `1 distance. Let Γ be the
cutoff parameter in Algorithm 3. Let S be the set of ∆0 items with the new user, therefore only the items in
S will change in G′1, G
′
2. WLOG, we can assume that the user changes both G1 and G2 by exactly total `1
distance of 1. Otherwise, in at least one of them all the items in S should reach the cutoff Γ. If this happens
with G1, then clearly Γ = G
′
1[u] ≥ G′2[u] for all u ∈ S. But it is easy to see that if this happens with G2,
then it should also happen with G1 in which case G
′
1[u] = G
′
2[u] = Γ for u ∈ S.
Imagine that at time t = 0, the user starts pushing mass continuously at a rate of 1 to both G1, G2 until
the entire mass of 1 is sent, which happens at time t = 1. The mass flow is equally split among all the
items which haven’t yet crossed cutoff. Let Gt1 and G
t
2 be the histograms at time t. Therefore G
0
i = Gi and
G1i = G
′
i. We claim that G
t
1 ≥ Gt2 implies that dG
t
1[u]
dt ≥ dG
t
2[u]
dt for all u ∈ S s.t. Gt1[u] < Γ. This is because
the flow is split equally among items which didn’t cross the cutoff, and there can only be more items in Gt2
which didn’t cross the the cutoff when compared to Gt1. And at time t = 0, we have G
0
1 ≥ G02. Therefore, we
have Gt1 ≥ Gt2 for all t ∈ [0, 1] and so G′1 ≥ G′2.
We will now prove `1-contraction. Let Ci = ‖Gi −G′i‖`1 . By the discussion above, C1 ≤ C2 (either total
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mass flow is equal to 1 for both or all items in S will reach cutoff Γ in G1 before this happens in G2).
‖G′1 −G′2‖`1
=
∑
u∈S
G′1[u]−
∑
u∈S
G′2[u] (Since G
′
1 ≥ G′2)
=
∑
u∈S
G1[u]−
∑
u∈S
G2[u] + C1 − C2
≤
∑
u∈S
G1[u]−
∑
u∈S
G2[u] (Since C1 ≤ C2)
= ‖G1 −G2‖`1 (Since G1 ≥ G2)
≤ 1.
Therefore (G′1, G
′
2) ∈ I which proves property (2) of Definition 1.3.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose D1 and D2 are neighboring databases where D1 has one extra user compared to D2.
Let H1 and H2 denote the histograms built by the Policy Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 4) when the
database is D1 and D2 respectively. Then ‖H1 −H2‖`1 ≤ 1.
Proof. Say the extra user in D1 has position t in the global ordering given by the hash function. Let H
i
1 and
Hi2 be the histograms after the first i (according to the global order) users data is added to the histogram.
Therefore Ht−11 = H
t−1
2 . And the new user updates H
t−1
1 to H
t
1. Since the total `1 change by an user is
at most 1,
∥∥Ht1 −Ht−11 ∥∥`1 = ∥∥Ht1 −Ht−12 ∥∥`1 ≤ 1. The remaining users are now added to Ht1, Ht−12 in the
same order. Note that we are using the fact that the users are sorted according some hash function and they
contribute in that order (this is also needed to claim that Ht−11 = H
t−1
2 ). Therefore, by the `1-contraction
property shown in Lemma 4.1, ‖H1 −H2‖`1 ≤ 1.
We now state a formal theorem which proves (ε, δ)−DP of Policy Laplace algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. The Policy Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 4) is (ε, δ)-DP when
ρLap ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
1
t
+
1
ε
log
(
1
2
(
1− (1− δ)1/t)
)
.
Proof. Suppose D1 and D2 are neighboring databases where D1 has one extra user compared to D2. Let P
and Q denote the distribution of output of the algorithm when the database is D1 and D2 respectively. We
want to show that P ≈ε,δ Q. Let E be the event that A ⊂ supp(H2).
Claim 4.1. P |E ≈ε,0 Q
Proof. Let H1 and H2 be the histograms generated by the algorithm from databases D1 and D2 respectively.
And Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 be the histograms obtained by adding Lap(0, 1/ε) noise to each entry of H1 and H2 respectively.
For any possible output A of Algorithm 4, we have
Q(A) = Pr[A = {u ∈ supp(H2) : Hˆ2[u] > ρLap}] and P |E(A) = Pr[A = {u ∈ supp(H2) : Hˆ1[u] > ρLap}].
So A ∼ P |E is obtained by post-processing Hˆ1|E and A ∼ Q is obtained by post-processing Hˆ2. Since post-
processing only makes two distributions closer (Lemma 2.2), it is enough to show that the distributions of the
Hˆ1|supp(H2) and Hˆ2 are (ε, 0)-close to each other. By Lemma 4.2, H1|supp(H2) and H2 differ in `1-distance by
at most 1. Therefore P |E ≈ε,0 Q by the properties of Laplace mechanism (see Theorem 3.6 in [DR14a]).
By Lemma 2.1, it is enough to show that P (E) ≥ 1−δ. Let T = supp(H1)\ supp(H2). Note that |T | ≤ ∆0
and H1[u] ≤ 1|T | for u ∈ T.
10
P (E¯) = Pr[∃u ∈ T | Hˆ1[u] > ρLap]
= 1− Pr[∀u ∈ T Hˆ1[u] ≤ ρLap]
= 1−
∏
u∈T
Pr[H1[u] +Xu ≤ ρLap] (Xu ∼ Lap(1/ε))
≤ 1−
∏
u∈T
Pr
[
Xu ≤ ρLap − 1|T |
]
(H1[u] ≤ 1|T | for u ∈ T )
= 1−
(
1− 1
2
exp
(
−ερLap + ε 1|T |
))|T |
(2)
Thus for
ρLap ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
1
t
+
1
ε
log
(
1
2
(
1− (1− δ)1/t)
)
,
we have P (E¯) ≤ δ. Therefore the Policy Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 4) is (ε, δ)-DP.
5 Policy Gaussian algorithm
In this section we will present an `2-contractive update policy called `2-descent (Algorithm 5) and use it to
obtain a DP Set Union algorithm called Policy Gaussian (Algorithm 4).
5.1 `2-descent update policy
Similar to the Laplace update policy, we will set some cutoff Γ above the threshold ρ and once an item’s
count (H[u]) crosses the cutoff, we don’t want to increase it further. In this policy, each user starts with a
budget of 1. But now, the total change a user can make to the histogram can be at most 1 when measured in
`2-norm (whereas in Laplace update policy we used `1-norm to measure change). In other words, sum of the
squares of the changes that the user makes is at most 1. Since we want to get as close to the cutoff (Γ) as
possible, the user moves the counts vector (restricted to the set W of ∆0 items the user has) in the direction
of the point (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ) by an `2-distance of at most 1. This update policy is presented in Algorithm 5.
This policy can also be interpreted as gradient descent to minimize the `2-distance between the current
weighted histogram and the point (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ), hence the name `2-descent. Since the gradient vector is
in the direction of the line joining the current point and (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ), the `2-descent policy is moving the
current histogram towards (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ) by an `2-distance of at most 1.
5.2 Policy Gaussian
The Policy Gaussian algorithm (Algorithm 6) for DPSU uses the framework of the meta algorithm in
Algorithm 1 using the Gaussian update policy (Algorithm 5). Since the added noise is N (0, σ2) which is
centered at 0, we want to set the cutoff Γ in the update policy to be sufficiently above (but not too high
above) the threshold ρGauss. Thus we pick Γ = ρGauss + α · σ for some α > 0. From our experiments, choosing
α ∈ [2, 6] empirically yields these best results. The parameters σ, ρGauss are set so as to achieve (ε, δ)-DP as
shown in Theorem 5.1. Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of standard Gaussian distribution and Φ−1(·)
is its inverse.
To find min
{
σ : Φ
(
1
2σ − εσ
)− eεΦ (− 12σ − εσ) ≤ δ2}, one can use binary search because Φ ( 12σ − εσ)−
eεΦ
(− 12σ − εσ) is a decreasing function of σ. An efficient and robust implementation of this binary search
can be found in [BW18].
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Algorithm 5 `2-descent update policy
Input: H: Current histogram
W : A subset of U of size at most ∆0
Γ: cutoff parameter
Output: H: Updated histogram
G = {} // Empty dictionary
for u ∈W do
// G is the vector joining H|W to (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ)
G[u]← Γ−H[u]
end for
// `2-distance between H|W and (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ)
Z ← (∑u∈W G[u]2)1/2
// If Z ≤ 1, then the user moves H|W to (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ). Else, move H|W in the direction of (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ) by
an `2-distance of at most 1
if Z < 1 then
for u ∈W do
H[u]← Γ
end for
else
for u ∈W do
H[u]← H[u] + G[u]Z
end for
end if
5.3 Privacy analysis of Policy Gaussian
In this section we will prove that the Policy Gaussian algorithm (Algorithm 6) is (ε, δ)-DP. By Theorem 1.2
and Theorem 1.1, it is enough to show `2-contractivity of `2-descent update policy. We will need a simple
plane geometry lemma for this.
Lemma 5.1. Let A,B,C denote the vertices of a triangle in the Euclidean plane. If |AB| > 1, let B′ be
the point on the side AB which is at a distance of 1 from B and if |AB| ≤ 1, define B′ = A. C ′ is defined
similarly. Then |B′C ′| ≤ |BC|.
B
C
A
C’
B’
BB’  = 1 
CC’  = 1 
AB’  = 𝑥
AC’  = 𝑦 
θ
Figure 2: Geometric illustration of Lemma 5.1 when |AB|, |AC| > 1. The lemma implies that |B′C ′| ≤ |BC|.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let us first assume that both |AB|, |AC| > 1. Let θ be the angle at A and let |AB′| =
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Algorithm 6 Policy Gaussian algorithm for DPSU
Input: D: Database of n users where each user has some subset W ⊂ U
∆0: maximum contribution parameter
(ε, δ): privacy parameters
α: parameter for setting cutoff
Output: S: A subset of ∪iWi
// Standard deviation in Gaussian noise
σ ← min{σ : Φ ( 12σ − εσ)− eεΦ (− 12σ − εσ) ≤ δ2}
// Threshold parameter
ρGauss ← max1≤t≤∆0
(
1√
t
+ σΦ−1
((
1− δ2
)1/t))
Γ← ρLap + α · σ // Cutoff parameter for update policy
Run Algorithm 1 with Noise ∼ N (0, σ2) and the `2-descent update policy in Algorithm 5 to output S.
x, |AC ′| = y as shown in Figure 2. Then by the cosine formula,
|BC|2 = |AB|2 + |AC|2 − 2|AB||AC| cos θ
= (x+ 1)2 + (y + 1)2 − 2(x+ 1)(y + 1) cos θ
= x2 + y2 + 2xy cos θ + 2(x+ y + 1)(1− cos θ)
≥ x2 + y2 + 2xy cos θ (cos θ ≤ 1)
= |B′C ′|2.
If |AB|, |AC| ≤ 1, then B′ = C ′ = A and then the claim is trivially true. Suppose |AB| > 1, |AC| ≤ 1. Now
B
C
A=C’
B’
BB’  = 1 
AB’  = 𝑥
AC  = 𝑧 
θ
Figure 3: Geometric explanation of Lemma 5.1 when |AB| > 1, |AC| ≤ 1.
C ′ = A. Let |AB′| = x, |AC| = z ≤ 1 and θ be the angle at A as shown in Figure 3. Then by the cosine
formula,
|BC|2 = |AB|2 + |AC|2 − 2|AB||AC| cos θ
= (x+ 1)2 + z2 − 2(x+ 1)z cos θ
= x2 + 2x(1− z cos θ) + (z − cos θ)2 + (1− cos2 θ)
≥ x2 = |AB′|2 = |B′C ′|2. (0 ≤ z ≤ 1, | cos θ| ≤ 1)
By symmetry, the claim is also true when |AC| > 1, |AB| ≤ 1.
Lemma 5.2. Let I = {(G1, G2) : ‖G1 −G2‖`2 ≤ 1}. Then the `2-descent update policy is `2-contractive
over the invariant set I.
Proof. Let φ denote the `2-descent policy. Property (2) of Definition 1.3 follows easily because each new
user can only change a weighted histogram by an `2-distance of at most 1.
We will now prove Property (1) of Definition 1.3. Let (G1, G2) ∈ I, i.e., ‖G1 −G2‖`2 ≤ 1. Let G′1 = φ(G1)
and G′2 = φ(G2). A new user can increase G1 and G2 by at most 1 in `2 distance. Let Γ be the cutoff
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parameter in Algorithm 5. Let S be the set of ∆0 items with the new user, therefore only the items in S
will change in G′1, G
′
2. Therefore we can just assume that G1, G2 are supported on S for the sake of the
analysis. Algorithm 6 moves Gi towards P = (Γ,Γ, . . . ,Γ) by an `2-distance of 1 (or to P if the distance to
P is already lower than 1). We can restrict ourselves to the plane containing G1, G2, P (G
′
1, G
′
2 will also lie
on the same plane). Now by Lemma 5.1, ‖G′1 −G′2‖`2 ≤ ‖G1 −G2‖`2 .
We now state a formal theorem which proves (ε, δ)−DP of Policy Gaussian algorithm. We prove it in
the supplementary material.
Theorem 5.1. The Policy Gaussian algorithm (Algorithm 6) is (ε, δ)-DP if σ, ρGauss are chosen s.t.
Φ
(
1
2σ
− εσ
)
− eεΦ
(
− 1
2σ
− εσ
)
≤ δ
2
and
ρGauss ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
(
1√
t
+ σΦ−1
((
1− δ
2
)1/t))
.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose D1 and D2 are neighboring databases where D1 has one extra user compared
to D2. Let P and Q denote the distribution of output of the algorithm when the database is D1 and D2
respectively. We want to show that P ≈ε,δ Q. Let E be the event that A ⊂ supp(H2).
Claim 5.1. P |E ≈ε,δ/2 Q
Proof. Let H1 and H2 be the histograms generated by the algorithm from databases D1 and D2 respectively.
And Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 be the histograms obtained by adding N (0, σ2) noise to each entry of H1 and H2 respectively.
By the post-processing lemma (Lemma 2.2), it is enough to show that the distributions of the Hˆ1|supp(H2) and
Hˆ2 are (ε, δ/2)-close to each other. Because the histogram building algorithm (Algorithm 2) has `2-sensitivity
of at most 1 by hypothesis,
∥∥H1|supp(H2) −H2∥∥`2 ≤ 1. Therefore by properties of Gaussian mechanism
(Proposition 2.2), it is enough to choose σ as in the statement of the theorem.
By Lemma 2.1, it is enough to show that P (E) ≥ 1 − δ/2. Let T = supp(H1) \ supp(H2). Note that
|T | ≤ ∆0 and H1[u] ≤ 1√|T | for u ∈ T.
P (E¯) = Pr[∃u ∈ T | Hˆ1[u] > ρGauss]
= 1− Pr[∀u ∈ T Hˆ1[u] ≤ ρGauss]
= 1−
∏
u∈T
Pr[Hˆ1[u] ≤ ρGauss]
= 1−
∏
u∈T
Pr[H1[u] +Xu ≤ ρGauss] (Xu ∼ N (0, σ2))
≤ 1−
∏
u∈T
Pr
[
Xu ≤ ρGauss − 1√|T |
]
(H1[u] ≤ 1√|T | for u ∈ T )
= 1−
∏
u∈T
Φ
(
ρGauss
σ
− 1√|T |
)|T |
(3)
Thus for
ρGauss ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
(
1√
t
+ σΦ−1
((
1− δ
2
)1/t))
,
we have P (E¯) ≤ δ/2. Therefore the DP Set Union algorithm (Algorithm 1) is (ε, δ)-DP.
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6 Experiments
While the algorithms we described generalize to many domains that involve the release of set union, our
experiments will use a natural language dataset. In the context of n-gram release, D is a database of users
where each user is associated with 1 or more Reddit posts and Wi is the set of unique n-grams used by each
user. The goal is to output as large a subset of n-grams ∪iWi as possible while providing (ε, δ)-differential
privacy to each user. In our experiments we consider n = 1 (unigrams)3.
6.1 Dataset
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Figure 4: Frequency (i.e. number of users who use the unigram) vs. rank of the unigram (based on frequency)
on a log-log scale. This linear relationship shows that the frequency of unigrams among users also follows
Zipf’s law (power law), i.e., count ∝ 1/rankα for some constant α > 0. The α in this case is ≈ 1.
Our dataset is collected from the subreddit r/AskReddit. We take a sample of 15,000 posts from each
month between January 2017 and December 2018. We filter out duplicate entries, removed posts, and deleted
authors. For text preprocessing, we remove URLs and symbols, lowercase all words, and tokenize using
nltk.word tokenize. After preprocessing, we again filter out empty posts to arrive at a dataset of 373,983
posts from 223,388 users.
Similar to other natural language datasets, this corpus follows Zipf’s law across users. The frequency
of unigrams across users is inversely proportional to the rank of the unigram. Using a log-log scale, the
frequency of users for each unigram vs. the rank of the unigram is linear (Figure 4). In other words, the
lowest ranked (most common) unigrams are used by almost all users while the highest ranked (least common)
unigrams are used by very few users.
Table 1: Percentage of users with unique unigram count of less than or equal to T. The vast majority of users
have less than 100 unique unigrams.
Threshold (T) Users with |Wi| ≤ T
1 2.78%
10 29.82%
50 79.16%
100 93.13%
300 99.59%
The distribution of how many unigrams each user uses also follows a long tail distribution. While the
top 10 users contribute between 850 and 2000 unique unigrams, most users (93.1%) contribute less than 100
3The code and dataset used for our experiments are available at https://github.com/heyyjudes/
differentially-private-set-union
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unique unigrams. Table 1 summarizes the percentage of users with a unique vocabulary smaller than each
threshold T provided.
6.2 Results
Table 2: Count of unigrams released by various set union algorithms. Results are averaged across 5 shuffles
of user order. The best results for each algorithm are in bold. The privacy parameters are ε = 3 and
δ = exp(−10). The cutoff Γ is calculated using α = 5.
∆0 1 10 50 100 200 300
Count Laplace 4484 ± 32 3666 ± 7 2199 ± 8 1502 ± 14 882 ± 4 647 ± 4
Count Gaussian 3179 ± 15 6616 ± 18 6998 ± 23 6470 ± 12 5492 ± 14 4813 ± 14
Weighted Laplace 4479 ± 26 4309 ± 15 4012 ± 10 3875 ± 9 3726 ± 17 3648 ± 12
Weighted Gaussian 3194 ± 11 6591 ± 18 8570 ± 14 8904 ± 24 8996 ± 30 8936 ± 12
Policy Laplace 4482 ± 21 12840 ± 28 15268 ± 10 14739 ± 23 14173 ± 25 13870 ± 23
Policy Gaussian 3169 ± 13 11010 ± 15 16181 ± 33 16954 ± 58 17113 ± 16 17022 ± 57
For the problem of outputting the large possible set of unigrams, Table 2 and Figure 5, summarize the
performance of DP set union algorithms for different values of ∆0. The privacy parameters are ε = 3 and
δ = exp(−10). We compare our algorithms with baseline algorithms: Count Laplace, Count Gaussian,
Weighted Laplace, and Weighted Gaussian discussed previously.
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Figure 5: Count of unigrams released by set union algorithms averaged across 5 shuffles of user order. Privacy
parameters are ε = 3 and δ = exp(−10). The cutoff Γ is calculated using α = 5.
Our conclusions are as follows:
• Our new algorithms Policy Laplace and Policy Gaussian output a DP set union that is 2-4 times
larger than output of weighted/count based algorithms. This holds for all values of ε ≥ 1.
• To put the size of released set in context, we compare our new algorithms against the number of
unigrams belonging to at least k users (See Table 3). For Policy Laplace with ∆0 = 100, the size of
the output set covers almost all unigrams (94.8%) when k = 20 and surpasses the size of the output
set when k ≥ 25. Policy Gaussian with ∆0 = 100 covers almost all unigrams (91.8%) when k = 15
and surpasses the size of the output set when k ≥ 18. In other words, our algorithms (with ε = 3 and
δ = exp(−10)) perform better than k-anonymity based algorithms for values of k around 20.
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Table 3: This table shows the total number of unigrams that at least k users possess (|Sk|) and the percentage
coverage of this total by Policy Laplace (|SPL| = 14739) and Policy Gaussian (SPG| = 16954) for
∆0 = 100.
k |Sk| % coverage Policy Laplace % coverage Policy Gaussian
5 34699 24.5% 48.9%
10 23471 62.8% 72.2%
15 18461 79.8% 91.8%
18 16612 88.7% 102.1%
20 15550 94.8% 109.0%
25 13638 108.1% 124.3%
Table 4: Count of unigrams released Policy Laplace and Policy Gaussian algorithms for single and
double passes over users. Results are averaged and rounded across 5 shuffles of user order. The privacy
parameters are ε = 3 and δ = exp(−10). α = 2 is chosen for the threshold parameter. Significant p-values for
a two-sided independent t-test are in bold.
Policy Laplace Policy Gaussian
∆0 1 Pass 2 Passes P-val 1 Pass 2 Passes P-val
1 4236 ± 14 4257 ± 17 0.083 3135 ± 25 3131 ± 20 0.829
10 12452 ± 31 12389 ± 17 0.008 10784 ± 22 10817 ± 54 0.293
50 15056 ± 35 15080 ± 21 0.262 15763 ± 33 15809 ± 45 0.139
100 14562 ± 50 14567 ± 24 0.846 14562 ± 50 14568 ± 24 0.846
200 14005 ± 33 13979 ± 31 0.271 14005 ± 33 13979 ± 31 0.271
300 13702 ± 37 13678 ± 47 0.448 13702 ± 37 13678 ± 47 0.447
6.2.1 Multiple passes through each user
In the experiments described thus far, each user contributes items once within the budget constraints. We
also investigate whether the output of set union increases in size when each user contributes the same budget
over multiple passes (e.g. user 1 contributes half of their budget each time over 2 passes), we compare Policy
Laplace and Policy Gaussian outputs. Table 4 summarizes the results showing that there is not strong
evidence suggesting that running multiple passes through the users improves the size of the output set.
6.2.2 Selecting α: parameter to set threshold Γ
Figure 6 shows the number of unigrams released by Policy Laplace and Policy Gaussian for various
values of α. We observe that the number of unigrams released increases sharply until α = 4, then remains
nearly constant and then slowly decreases. This choice of α only affects the policy algorithms since the
weighted and count algorithms do not use a threshold.
6.2.3 The effect of ε
We use ε = 3 for the experiments in Table 2. At this value of ε our policy algorithms perform much better
than previous count and weighted algorithms. To check whether this result holds with smaller ε, we also run
these algorithms on various values of ε. Figure 1 shows that for ε ≥ 1 our policy algorithms always perform
better.
6.2.4 Selecting hyperparameters while maintaining privacy
As can be seen from Table 2 the ∆0 resulting in the largest output set varies by algorithm. Since most users
in our dataset possess less than 300 unique unigrams, it is not surprising that the largest output set can be
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Figure 6: Number of unigrams released for various values of α. The number of unigrams released increases
sharply until about α = 2, then remains nearly constant and then decreases. Here we fixed ∆0 = 100 and
ε = 3.
achieved with ∆0 < 300. However, running our algorithms for different values of ∆0 and selecting the best
output will result in a higher value of ε. There are several ways to find the best value of ∆0 (or any other
tunable parameter): 1) using prior knowledge of the data 2) running the algorithms on a small sample of the
data to find the best parameters, and discarding that sample. 3) finally, one could also run all the algorithms
in parallel and choose the best performing one. Here we will have to account for the loss in privacy budget;
see [LT19] for example.
7 Conclusions and open problems
We initiated the study of differentially private set union problem, which has many real-world applications.
We designed better algorithms for the problem using the notion of contractive update policy as a guiding
principle. One immediate question is to give theoretical guarantees on the size of set union produced by our
algorithms. A more interesting and significantly challenging question is to design instance optimal algorithms
for the problem. Given the ubiquitous nature of this problem, we believe that it is a worthwhile direction to
explore.
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A Bounded Sensitivity implies DP (Proof of Theorem 1.2)
In this section, we will prove a formal version of Theorem 1.2, i.e., if the histogram output by Algorithm 2 has
bounded `p-sensitivity (for p ∈ {1, 2}), then by adding appropriate noise and setting an appropriate threshold,
Algorithm 1 for DP set union can be made differentially private. The lower bounds on the threshold (ρ) that
we obtain in this generality are only slightly worse compared to the corresponding bounds in Theorems 4.1
and 5.1.
Theorem A.1. Suppose the histogram output by Algorithm 2 has `1-sensitivity 1. Then Algorithm 1 is
(ε, δ)-DP when the Noise distribution is Lap(0, λ) where λ = 1/ε and the threshold
ρ ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
1 +
1
ε
log
(
1
2
(
1− (1− δ)1/t)
)
.
Proof. Proof of Theorem A.1 is extremely similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. The only place where it differs
is in Equation (2) where we bound H1[u] ≤ 1 instead of H1[u] ≤ 1/|T |.
Theorem A.2. Suppose the histogram output by Algorithm 2 has `2-sensitivity 1. Then Algorithm 1 is
(ε, δ)-DP when the Noise distribution is N (0, σ2) where σ and the threshold ρ are chosen s.t.
Φ
(
1
2σ
− εσ
)
− eεΦ
(
− 1
2σ
− εσ
)
≤ δ
2
and
ρ ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
(
1 + σΦ−1
((
1− δ
2
)1/t))
.
Proof. Proof of Theorem A.2 is extremely similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. The only place where it
differes is in Equation (3) where we bound H1[u] ≤ 1 instead of H1[u] ≤ 1/
√|T |.
B Weighted Laplace and Gaussian algorithms
B.1 Weighted Laplace
Algorithm 7 Laplace weighted update
Input: H: Current histogram
W : A subset of U of size at most ∆0
Output: H: Updated histogram
for u in W do
H[u] ← H[u] + 1|W |
end for
Theorem B.1. The Weighted Laplace algorithm (Algorithm 7) is (ε, δ)-DP when
ρLap ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
1
t
+
1
ε
log
(
1
2
(
1− (1− δ)1/t)
)
.
Proof. Proof is exactly the same as that of Theorem 4.1.
B.2 Weighted Gaussian
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Algorithm 8 Gaussian weighted update
Input: H: Current histogram
W : A subset of U of size at most ∆0
Output: H: Updated histogram
for u in W do
H[u] ← H[u] +
√
1
|W |
end for
Theorem B.2. The Weighted Gaussian algorithm (Algorithm 8) is (ε, δ)-DP if σ, ρGauss are chosen s.t.
Φ
(
1
2σ
− εσ
)
− eεΦ
(
− 1
2σ
− εσ
)
≤ δ
2
and
ρGauss ≥ max
1≤t≤∆0
(
1√
t
+ σΦ−1
((
1− δ
2
)1/t))
.
Proof. Proof is exactly the same as that of Theorem 5.1.
C Greedy policy
Figure 7: Visualization of greedy update example where the final l1 sensitivity is larger than 1.
In this section, we give a simple counter example to illustrate how the sensitivity of a greedy policy algorithm
can be unbounded.
Suppose there are N users, let u1 and u2 be two items in the universe. We will denote the weight of
item u after user i’s contribution as H(i)[u]. Suppose user i has only item u1 while users i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , N
have both items. Let H1 be the histogram generated with all N users while H2 be the histogram generated
without user i. Let ∆0 = 2 and H
(i−1)[u1] < H(i−1)[u2] < 1 +H(i−1)[u1]. According to the greedy update
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Algorithm 9 Greedy Policy update
Input: H: Current histogram
W : A subset of U of size at most ∆0
Γ: cutoff parameter
Output: H: Updated histogram
// Build cost dictionary G
G = {} // Empty dictionary
for u ∈W do
if H[u] < Γ then
// Gap to cutoff for items below cutoff Γ
G[u]← Γ−H[u]
end if
end for
budget ← 1 // Each user gets a total budget of 1
// Sort in increasing order of the gap Γ−H[u]
G← sort(G)
// Let u1, u2, . . . , u|G| be the sorted order
for j = 1 to |G| do
if G[uj ] ≤ budget then
H[uj ]← H[uj ] +G[uj ]
budget ← budget - G[uj ]
else
H[uj ]← H[uj ]+ budget
break
end if
end for
described in Algorithm 9, in H1, user i will add weight 1 to u1 and users i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , N will also to u1
since H(i)[u1] > H
(i)[u2]. In H2, users i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , N will add to u2 since H
(i−1)[u1] < H(i−1)[u2]. This
process is described in figure 7. Therefore the `1-sensitivity of the histogram built using Greedy Policy update
(Algorithm 9) can be Ω(Γ, N).
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